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Abstract 
In this paper we test for the hysteresis versus the natural rate hypothesis on the 
unemployment rates of the EU new members using unit root tests that account for the 
presence of level shifts. As a by product, the analysis proceeds to the estimation of a 
NAIRU measure from a univariate point of view. The paper also focuses on the precision of 
these NAIRU estimates studying the two sources of inaccuracy that derive from the break 
points estimation and the autoregressive parameters estimation. The results point to the 
existence of up to four structural breaks in the transition countries NAIRU that can be 
associated with institutional changes implementing market-oriented reforms. Moreover, the 
degree of persistence in unemployment varies dramatically among the individual countries 
depending on the stage reached in the transition process. 
JEL Classification: C22, C23, E24 
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Resum 
En aquest article es contrasta la histèresi front la hipòtesi de la taxa natural d’atur pels nous 
membres de la UE emprant contrastos d’arrel unitària que tenen en compte la presència de 
canvis estructurals. Adicionalment, el treball duu a terme l’estimació d’una mesura de la 
NAIRU emprant tècniques univariants. Al llarg del treball es farà èmfasi en la precisió 
d’aquestes estimacions de la NAIRU analitzant dues possibles fonts d’imprecisió derivades 
de l’estimació dels punts de trencament i de l’estimació dels paràmetres autoregressius. Els 
resultats evidencien l’existència de fins a quatre canvis estructurals que afecten el valor de 
la NAIRU pels països en transició, canvis estructurals que poden ser associats a canvis 
institucionals ocasionats per la implementació de reformes orientades cap a una economia 
de mercat. Finalment, el treball mostra com el grau de persistència en la desocupació varia 
radicalment entre els països considerats segons el nivell assolit en el procés de transició. 
 
1. Introduction
Enlargement is one of the most important challenges in the European Union
(EU) agenda. Although it is not the rst time that the EU is admitting countries
with lower levels of economic development than the existing members, three
characteristics make the present enlargement unique. The rst difference concerns
their nature as planned socialist economies that started a process of transition to
private market economies; the second difference is the income gap between new
and old members and third, but not less important, the potential for labor migration
after the accession. Due to income differentials and geographical proximity to
core EU countries, the current enlargement could result in higher migration ows
than in previous occasions.
The accession countries included in the enlargement process at present consist
of ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), as well as Cyprus, Malta
and Turkey. Since 1989, the process of transition has proceeded at a rapid pace.
However, only eight out of the ten CEECs have fullled the so-called Copenhagen
criteria set up in June 1993, and consequently, Bulgaria and Romania have been
excluded from the May 2004 enlargement.
Focusing on the evolution of the labor markets, employment fell considerably
in the CEECs during the transitional contraction period and continued to decline
since then, despite transitory improvements in the economic growth pace from the
middle of the nineties. Besides, there was a decrease in participation rates, which
fell from the high levels typical of socialist economies. Unemployment exploded
in the early transition years having a striking effect on poverty and social exclusion
–see Commission (2001). Since 1994, measured unemployment, based on labor
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market surveys following the ILO methodology1, rst decreased slightly below
10 per cent but increased again. However, in relative contrast to the overall pace
of structural change in the transition countries, labor markets are characterized by
very low mobility of workers across labor market strata, occupation and sectors
(Boeri, Burda and Köllö (1998) and Huber (1999)).
The macroeconomic stabilization measures that these countries had to
accomplish in order to meet the requirements for joining the EU, such as
budgetary consolidations or ination and exchange rate stabilizations are likely
to have caused important shocks to output, prices and unemployment. Thus,
unemployment is one of the key variables to facilitate the adjustment process
through macroeconomic equilibrium. Moreover, with irrevocably xed exchange
rates, country-specic monetary conditions can no longer cushion differences
in cyclical positions nor help them to adjust to asymmetric shocks. Within a
prospective enlarged euro area, if required, real exchange rate changes will have
to be achieved by real wage changes directly, rather than indirectly via changes
in the nominal exchange rate. The large rates of structural unemployment and the
high regional concentration of unemployment suggest that labor market exibility
is not currently up to this requirement and, therefore, more geographic mobility
would be needed (and expected). In the prospect of euro-area membership, the
fulllment of the Maastricht criteria will imply ination rates in line with the
2% European Central Bank rate. Due to the real adjustment process involved,
further employment destruction may be expected. In order to implement EU level
policy measures to address the social problems associated, knowledge about the
1 The denition of and measurement of unemployment are neither very precise nor uniform
among countries, so that a cross-country comparison of unemployment rates requires some
adjustment to transform national measures into a reasonably standardized indicator. The stan-
dardized unemployment rates, which are based on labor market surveys, greatly improve com-
parability among countries. This measure, though, has some limitations as a measure of labor
market slack, since it excludes discouraged workers, part-time employment, early retirement,
government training and employment schemes and invalidity or disability schemes.
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structural rate of unemployment and its shifting nature may be crucial for policy
makers (De Grauwe (1975)).
From an economic policy point of view, the approach that explains the ination-
unemployment relationship dates back to the 60’s and 70’s. The concept of
structural or “natural” rate of unemployment was rst introduced by Friedman
(1968) and Phelps (1968). According to this approach, in the long-run the
structural rate of unemployment is reached and hence there is no long-term
trade-off between ination and unemployment. However, in the short-term the
Phillips Curve exists. An important element of this approach is the concept of a
nonaccelerating ination rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, dened for the rst
time by Modigliani and Papademos (1975) as an unemployment rate (or range
of unemployment rates) that produces a stable rate of ination serving as the
empirical counterpart of the unobserved “natural rate of unemployment” –see
Franz (2003). Supply shocks and ination expectations are also commonly felt
to be important determinants of ination, and the NAIRU may change over time
depending on the structure of the economy and government policy. Although
this concept is no longer very popular among academic economists, both, the
NAIRU and the theory of the ination-unemployment relationship on which it is
based still receives much attention from press and among economic policy makers
(Espinosa-Vega and Russell (1997)). In particular, the OECD has been developing
a research program to provide accurate measures of the NAIRU. Within this
framework, the OECD denes three different NAIRU concepts, which vary by
the timeframe they cover (Richardson, Boone, Giorno, Meacci, Rae and Turner
(2000)). The rst one, or “short-term NAIRU”, is the rate of unemployment
required to stabilize the ination rate at its current level in the next period. This
short-term concept is more volatile by denition as it requires a level of NAIRU
that will provide an inationary offset to any impact from short-term supply
shocks, expectations, and possible speed limit/persistence effects. This paper
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focuses on the short-term NAIRU which is potentially the most appropriate to
help policymakers to assess inationary developments in the short-term (Estrella
and Mishkin (1998) and King (1999)).
A second NAIRU concept is the medium-term one. This NAIRU is the
equilibrium rate that unemployment converges to in the absence of temporary
supply shocks and the dynamic adjustment of ination to previous shocks is
completed. Finally, a third denition is the long-term equilibrium unemployment
rate which is equivalent to the long-term steady state, as the NAIRU has fully
adjusted to all long and short-term supply and policy shocks.
As Szeto and Guy (2004) state, of these three denitions only the rst two can
be estimated; the short-term NAIRU can be directly estimated and the medium-
term NAIRU can be estimated by controlling adequately for short term inuences
(when possible).
In this paper we analyze the persistence pattern of aggregate unemployment
for the Acceding Countries into the European Union, testing for hysteresis in their
unemployment rates, and computing a simple measure of short-term NAIRU. This
goal is important for several reasons. First, gaining insight about the degree of
persistence helps to assess the effects of labor market reforms as well as macro-
stabilization policies undertaken by this countries; second, it can be used as
a tool to ascertain asymmetries in labor markets across the new EU members
and between them and the rest of the EU in the future, especially on the way
to a prospective enlarged monetary union; third, the NAIRU may still have an
indicative role for policy makers.
From a methodological point of view, we contribute to the empirical literature
in three respects. First, we take into account the small sample problem common
to all empirical analyses of transition economies by applying the M unit root
tests by Ng and Perron (2001) when testing for hysteresis. Secondly, we address
the issue of structural changes typical of all post-communist countries in Central
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and Eastern Europe, as recently stressed by Fidrmuc and Tichit (2004). For this
purpose, we use tests that allow us to endogenously determine the potentially
multiple structural breaks. This is an important feature as previous studies on
transition economies found important differences among the countries depending
on the temporal pace of the reforms. Finally, we compute an improved measure of
both point and condence intervals of the NAIRU, based on the previous structural
change analysis.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we offer an overview of
the univariate approach adopted for measuring the NAIRU. Section 3 reports the
results of the applied research focusing, rstly, on the hysteresis versus natural
rate hypothesis testing and, secondly, on how precisely the NAIRU is estimated.
We also compute the half lives associated with the obtained NAIRU as a measure
of persistence. Finally, Section 4 presents the main conclusions.
2. The univariate approach to measure the NAIRU: A brief
overview
According to McAdam and McMorrow (1999) there are two broad modelling
approaches to measure the NAIRU, namely the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve approach, which singles out a series of labor markets variables as potential
empirical determinants of the NAIRU, and the univariate method, where the time
series properties of the macro variables are used to determine the NAIRU.
The former approach establishes the NAIRU at the point where a stable Phillips-
curve relationship exists between the deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU
and unexpected ination. Within this context it is possible to distinguish two
variants, the single equation ination approach and the multiple equation wage-
price model (e.g. the Bargaining model). This approach corresponds more
closely to a measure of the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment. Although
these structural models can provide a strong theoretical framework, they do not
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allow specic estimates of the NAIRU and are subject to several criticisms2 (
Richardson et al. (2000)). Firstly, there is no agreement about the appropriate
theoretical model (e.g. long-run effects of changes in real interest rates, taxation
or productivity growth on real wages and equilibrium unemployment); second,
there is a lack of consensus on specication issues (number and identity of
explanatory variables and its linear-non linear and/or symmetric-asymmetric
nature)3; third, there is a statistical identication problem typical of systems of
equations where the determined variable enters as explanatory variable at the same
time, creating the well known endogeneity problems. Finally, there are many
difculties to obtain reliable data about institutional variables (unemployment
benets, employment protection, degree of unionization...) which have an
increasing importance to determining structural unemployment (Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000), Belot and Van Ours (2001)).
Therefore, as an alternative to multivariate approaches that look for the level
and determinants of the NAIRU, the univariate approach is the one that we apply
in this paper. We think that the above mentioned aws of the structural approach
are especially acute in the particular case of the transition countries. Note that
the degrees of freedom in the estimations would be seriously compromised by the
scarcity and reliability of the time-series information available.
The univariate approach is essentially statistical, with the underlying
assumption being that unemployment reverts to its mean or natural rate over time.
Thus, previous to any empirical research aiming at measuring the NAIRU, the
2 Renements of the empirical specications led Gordon (1997) to summarize them in terms of
three factors: expectations/intertia, the unemployment gap, and supply shocks, being important
to distinguish between temporary (changes in real import prices or changes in real oil prices)
and long-lasting supply shocks (level of real interest rates, tax wedge, demographics...). The
former are expected to revert to zero over the long horizon and are particularly important for
monetary policy, while the latter may permanently alter the NAIRU, so that ination will vary
until unemployment adjusts.
3 This point is especially relevant when the objective is to apply the same specication accross
many countries (as it would be the case in the present paper).
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hypothesis of hysteresis in unemployment should be discarded. The economic
literature has experienced an increasing debate on testing the natural rate paradigm
versus the hysteresis hypothesis of the unemployment rate. Most of the empirical
evidence has focused on developed countries, mainly because these countries
suffered more intensively the effects of the oil crises, which meant an increase
in both the level and the persistence of the observed unemployment rate.
The natural rate theory assumes that the unemployment rate evolves around
an equilibrium level (or natural rate) describing stationary uctuations. This
equilibrium level is set depending on fundamentals of the economy such as labor
productivity, technology, world real interest rates and the real exchange rate, to
mention a few –see Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967, 1968, 1994). In contrast,
the hysteresis hypothesis implies that the shocks affecting the unemployment rate
have a permanent effect on the variable so that it never attains its equilibrium
level. In this extreme case, unemployment is not anchored by structural variables,
but will instead reect the cumulative effect of all past shocks to the economy,
including those to demand. Thus, this hypothesis can be formulated in terms of
unit root testing, with perfect hysteresis associated with the non-rejection of a unit
root.
The decomposition of the unemployment rate into “cyclical” and “structural”
unemployment is important for analytical and policy reasons. The structural
unemployment rate ( ¹U ) is dened as the equilibrium rate of unemployment, or the
rate at which there is no tendency emanating from the labor market or ination to
either increase or decrease, that is why it is also called the NAIRU.
In practice, the distinction between structural and cyclical unemployment is
complicated due to the existence of either unemployment persistence effects
or “hysteresis”. The concept of hysteresis can be easily explained using a
conventional Phillips curve:
7
¼t = ¯(L)¼t ¡ a(Ut ¡ ¹Ut); (1)
where ¼t is the rate of ination, ¯(L) the lag operator, Ut the actual rate of
unemployment and ¹Ut the structural rate.
In this basic version, ¹Ut is identical to the NAIRU but if we introduce the
possibility of full hysteresis, this equation changes to:
¼t = ¯(L)¼t ¡ a[Ut ¡ ¯(L)Ut¡1]; (2)
and ¹Ut will no longer be uniquely dened, while the NAIRU will equal the
lagged unemployment rate. As a consequence, there will be a permanent trade-
off between ination and unemployment, but the long-term equilibrium rate of
unemployment will not be permanent anymore and will change as a result of
cumulative past shocks to the economy –see Blanchard and Summers (1987).
An intermediate variant, including both a stable ¹Ut and partial hysteresis (or
“persistence”) effects, can also be specied as follows:
¼t = ¯(L)¼t ¡ a(Ut ¡ ¹Ut)¡ b[Ut ¡ ¯(L)Ut¡1]: (3)
Introducing a persistence element into a Phillips curve results in a deviation
between ¹Ut and the NAIRU. The latter will now be a linear combination of ¹Ut
and the lagged actual unemployment rate:
NAIRUt =
a
(a+ b)
¹Ut +
b
(a+ b)
¯(L)Ut: (4)
This opens the possibility that ination increases even if Ut > ¹Ut, which will
happen if the actual unemployment rate drops too fast. This is why the partial
hysteresis effect is also referred to as “speed-limit” effect. ¹Ut and the NAIRU will
be equal only in long-term equilibrium, when ¹Ut equals ¯(L)Ut. It is therefore
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justied to refer to ¹Ut and the NAIRU as the “long-run” and “short-run” structural
(or equilibrium) rates of unemployment, respectively. The distinction between
¹Ut and the NAIRU is rarely made in practice in the context of policy formulation,
reecting the difculties of measuring either concept with precision (IMF (2001)).
However, it is crucial to bear in mind this distinction when interpreting the results
of the present paper, where the estimation has focused on the short-term NAIRU.
Note that if there is evidence of inertia, this can delay the adjustment of the short-
term NAIRU, keeping it closer to the actual unemployment rate than to the long-
run NAIRU for prolonged periods. Again, this implies the possibility of “speed-
limit” effects, so that if the actual unemployment rate is well above the long-
run NAIRU, it will only be possible to close the gap slowly without increasing
ination. Divergences between short and medium-long NAIRU can be great when
persistence effects are strong. Departure between both variables can be substantial
and prolonged due to the relatively weak effects of the unemployment gap on
ination. At the same time stimulative policy actions can be postponed to avoid
short term inationary “speed limit” effects.
The validity of the natural rate hypothesis is based on two assumptions –
see Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967, 1968). Firstly, the uniqueness of the
equilibrium level of unemployment and its independence frommonetary variables
in the steady-state. Secondly, actual unemployment tends to return to the natural
rate given that expectations tend to correct themselves sooner or later. The
rejection of either of these two assumptions would imply refuting the natural rate
hypothesis. While initially the absence of theories explaining the determination
of the natural rate meant that in practice it was taken to be constant, subsequent
developments have attempted to explain the reasons behind changes across
economies and over time. Among the structural factors inuencing the natural
rate are the productivity level and its growth, energy prices, international trade,
union power, and normative traditions –for a discussion of these issues see Bianchi
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and Zoega (1998). Note that the experience of the acceding countries in transition
from communism to capitalism suggests important changes in the fundamentals of
the economies, affecting among others the labor market. This casts serious doubts
on the empirical validity of the natural rate theory and therefore, an alternative
specication that accounts for slow adjustments toward a shifting natural rate
could be more realistic.
Most of the empirical literature focused on testing for hysteresis or persistence
in unemployment has been based on analyzing the sum of the coefcients in the
autoregressive process representing the unemployment rate. Values close to but
lower than one were associated with partial hysteresis, that is, strong persistence.
In contrast, perfect or pure hysteresis exists when the sum of the coefcients is
equal to one. It should be stressed that only in the latter case is the natural rate
hypothesis violated, given that even in cases of strong persistence unemployment
slowly converges to the natural rate. However, it is sensible to state that in such a
case the difference is negligible –see Bianchi and Zoega (1998). However, the fact
that the effects of the level of unemployment on ination are relatively weak and
slow-acting, instead of non-existent, makes an important difference with relevant
implications for the relationship between actual unemployment, the NAIRU and
the associated unemployment gap.
In this context, unit root tests have been widely applied to unemployment rates
–see Blanchard and Summers (1987), Decressin and Fatás (1995) and Bianchi
and Zoega (1998)–, whose ndings favor, in general, the hypothesis of hysteresis
versus the natural rate, as the null was not rejected. Mostly the evidence supports
hysteresis in the EU economies and the natural rate in the US and Nordic countries
–see Papell, Murray and Ghiblawi (2000). However, those conclusions are based
on unit root tests that under the alternative assume a constant, unique, natural rate
of unemployment. Unfortunately, these test statistics are not robust to the presence
of structural breaks –see Perron (1989) and Montañés and Reyes (1998). In order
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to overcome this limitation, new contributions have allowed for a more exible
specication of the deterministic component in unit root tests. For instance,
Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1999) and Papell et al. (2000) apply unit
root tests that allow for structural breaks in the unemployment rates of samples
of OECD countries. For the majority of the countries analyzed the null of pure
hysteresis (unit root) is rejected in favor of the alternative of stationarity around a
changing equilibrium rate. Papell et al. (2000) conclude that such a nding seems
to be more in accordance with the structuralist theories of unemployment. The
institutional characteristics of the Accession countries recommend to account for
the presence of structural breaks when assessing the stochastic properties of the
unemployment rates, provided that a misspecication error of the deterministic
function would lead to infer wrong conclusions and, hence, to apply spurious
economic policy advice.
Although the univariate approach is purely statistical (by contrast to the
structural modelling approach) and offers indicators of trend unemployment that
are consistently estimated across countries, they suffer from a number of practical
drawbacks (Richardson et al. (2000)). First, the estimated indicators are often
not very well correlated with ination and are difcult to extrapolate even in the
short-term. Second, they tend to be least reliable at the end of the sample, that
is precisely the period of most interest for policy issues. This problem can be
partially solved by adding forecasts at the end of the data sample. Third, as most
of the lters behave like simple moving averages, they tend to perform poorly
if a sudden change in the unemployment rate occurs. This problem has been
tackled allowing for different means of the unemployment rate across the sample
( Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997)). Finally, it is difcult to judge the degree of
precision of the results. In order to overcome these problems, in this paper we
use more sophisticated estimation techniques that help us to allow for structural
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changes and measure the statistical uncertainty surrounding the NAIRU estimates,
calculating condence intervals.
Moreover, recent contributions aiming at improving the estimation of the
NAIRU using a univariate approach have emphasized its time-varying nature,
modelling the variable either as a deterministic function of time or as an
unobserved stochastic process, evaluating the uncertainty surrounding these
estimates –see King, Stock and Watson (1995), Staiger et al. (1997) and Gordon
(1997). This is the approach followed in this paper.
3. Empirical results
The main limitation for the analysis is the short span of the statistical
information available for these new EU countries. The standard sources of
statistical information such as the OECD, AMECO and EUROSTAT databases
just offer a short sample of unemployment rates for these countries. Thus, in
order to test for hysteresis in the unemployment rate we have applied the M
unit root tests proposed by Ng and Perron (2001) that offer suitable properties
in nite samples. Additionally, due to the institutional changes experienced by
these countries during the period studied, we consider the existence of one or
two structural breaks endogenously determined using the tests of Perron and
Vogelsang (1992), and Montañés and Reyes (1997) as well as the tests by
Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), respectively. In a second stage, following the
strategy of Papell et al. (2000), we apply the procedure developed by Bai and
Perron (1998) to the stationary series determined in the previous phase to obtain
the number of structural breaks with some condence intervals that are used to
estimate the NAIRU in the transition countries. For this purpose, we apply the
methodology developed by Staiger et al. (1997) which is based on univariate
models.
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The combination of these elements allows us to obtain both point and
condence intervals estimates of the NAIRU that offer a picture of the precision
achieved in the calculations. This is a relevant question since it has been argued
that the NAIRU has been traditionally measured quite imprecisely, casting doubts
on the role that these estimates should play in discussions of monetary policy –
see Staiger et al. (1997). As an additional test for hysteresis versus persistence,
we compute the half lives associated with the obtained NAIRU values as well as
modied Phillips Curves using the obtained short-run NAIRU estimates.
3.1 Hysteresis or natural rate of unemployment in the acceding
countries?
In this Section we analyze the order of integration of the unemployment rates
for all the countries acceding to the EU in May 2004, with the exception of
Cyprus. Due to the particularities of this group of countries, we have a constraint
concerning the time span available for any economic variable. Thus, we have
decided to use monthly data, in order to increase the number of observations4.
The monthly harmonized unemployment rates have been taken from EUROSTAT
(Euroindicators) for the period 1998:12 to 2003:11. Then, we have applied
backwards the growth rates of the monthly unemployment rates drawn from León-
Ledesma and McAdam (2004) to extend the database5 that, at best, covers from
1991:1 to 2003:116. These harmonized unemployment rates are depicted in Figure
1.
In a rst step of the analysis, the hysteresis hypothesis is tested through the
application of the unit root tests to each time series. In this Section we use
4 However, we are aware of the limitations of proceeding this way, since the increase of the
frequency does not imply an increase of the long-run information.
5 We thank Miguel León-Ledesma for kindly providing us the data.
6 Specically, for the Czech Republic the data spans from 1991:1 to 2003:10, Estonia (1995:5,
2003:11), Hungary (1991:3, 2003:11), Latvia (1994:1, 2003:11), Lithuania (1994:1, 2003:11),
Malta (1997:3, 2003:10), Poland (1991:1, 2003:11), Slovakia (1991:1, 2003:11) and Slovenia
(1992:1, 2003:11).
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Table 1: M-class Unit root tests
Z® MZ® MZt MSB PT MPT ADF
Czech Rep. 0.099 0.153 0.120 0.782 47.111 38.205 0.117
(0.789) (0.789) (0.792) (0.859) (0.856) (0.851) (0.800)
Estonia -2.543 -2.480 -1.094 0.441 12.059 9.776 -1.121
(0.353) (0.351) (0.310) (0.465) (0.410) (0.376) (0.307)
Hungary -0.736 -0.678 -0.512 0.755 38.739 29.508 -0.517
(0.623) (0.624) (0.576) (0.842) (0.805) (0.779) (0.584)
Latvia -3.035 -2.979 -1.220 0.410 10.106 8.224 -1.226
(0.302) (0.298) (0.254) (0.406) (0.347) (0.310) (0.262)
Lithuania -2.415 -2.338 -0.992 0.424 12.854 9.919 -1.002
(0.374) (0.373) (0.364) (0.436) (0.437) (0.386) (0.371)
Malta 0.108 0.349 0.217 0.622 40.598 27.768 0.054
(0.850) (0.863) (0.861) (0.801) (0.861) (0.832) (0.842)
Poland 0.203 0.269 0.209 0.779 49.897 38.932 0.182
(0.808) (0.810) (0.815) (0.856) (0.869) (0.855) (0.817)
Slovakia 0.228 0.292 0.321 1.097 92.367 70.830 0.295
(0.813) (0.815) (0.842) (0.973) (0.968) (0.961) (0.844)
Slovenia -1.828 -1.769 -0.893 0.505 17.019 13.175 -0.923
(0.440) (0.440) (0.402) (0.568) (0.534) (0.489) (0.397)
P-values in parentheses.
the so-called M-tests proposed in Ng and Perron (2001) and based on the GLS
detrending procedure by Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) due to their better
small sample performance in terms of empirical size and power. We also present
in Table 1 the feasible point optimal test statistic, PT ; by Elliot et al. (1996) and
the GLS detrended ADF test or ADFGLS:
These are the test statistics that we have computed, in the rst stage of the
analysis, to test for the unit root hypothesis (hysteresis) in unemployment. The
deterministic specication consists of a constant term (p = 0) that is consistent
with the natural rate paradigm. In order to take into account the presence of
autocorrelation we have set kmax = int
³
12 (T=100)1=4
´
using the MAIC (k)
criterion to choose the lag augmentation. Instead of using the asymptotic critical
values in Ng and Perron (2001), we have applied the nite sample p-values from
the estimated P-value functions in Carrion-i-Silvestre (2003). The results are
reported in Table 1, which shows that there is strong evidence in favor of the
unit root hypothesis for all countries –the p-values are in parentheses.
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However, based on the visual inspection of the unemployment rates in Figure
1, we should consider the possible presence of structural breaks that may have
affected the acceding countries unemployment rates. Thus, the natural rate might
be experiencing a slowly transition between shifting natural rates, movements
probably due, in turn, to changes in the fundamentals of the economies. It is well
known that the presence of these breaks can provoke the spurious non-rejection
of the null hypothesis in standard unit root tests–see Perron (1989) and Montañés
and Reyes (1998). Thus, in order to account for this possible problem, we have
computed a group of ADF-type unit root test allowing for structural breaks.
These tests can be specied using a general regression equation:
yt = ¹+¯t+
nX
i=1
µiDUi;t+
nX
i=1
°iDTi;t+
nX
i=1
diD (Tb)i;t+®yt¡1+
kX
j=1
cj¢yt¡j+"t;
(5)
with DUi;t = 1 and DTi;t = t for t > Tb;i, 0 elsewhere; D(Tb)i;t = 1 for
t = (Tb;i + 1) and 0 elsewhere, and where Tb;i denes the i-th (i = 1; :::; n)
structural change. As before, testing for the null hypothesis of hysteresis in
unemployment rate means that ¯ = 0 and °i = 0, 8i = 1; :::; n, in ((5)). From this
general specication, several test statistics have been proposed, that differ mainly
on the method that is applied to choose the break points and the formulation of
the alternative hypothesis.
First, we deal with the situation in which there is just one structural break.
One of the most used and popular unit root test statistic that takes into account
the presence of a structural break is the one proposed by Perron and Vogelsang
(1992). These authors suggest estimating the break date through the minimization
of the sequence that is obtained after the ADF test is computed at all possible break
dates. We denote this test as t¤®, i.e. the ADF test that estimates the break date as
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T ¤b = argminTb2(k+1;T ) t®^ (Tb; k), where t®^ is the pseudo t-ratio for ® in ((5))
7.
While Perron and Vogelsang (1992) deal with non-trending variables allowing for
one structural break both under the null and alternative hypotheses –henceforth,
we denote their specication as Model An– Zivot and Andrews (1992) derive the
limit distribution of the test when it is applied to trending variables, but allowing
for a structural break just under the alternative hypothesis8. The tests in Zivot and
Andrews (1992) are for the joint null hypothesis of unit root without structural
break and the alternative of stationarity with one structural break.
Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) extend the analysis in Zivot and Andrews (1992)
to account for two structural breaks in trending variables using three deterministic
specications known as Models AA, AC-CA and CC, i.e. a model that accounts
for two structural breaks that affect the level (Model AA), a model that accounts
for two level shifts but just one slope shift (Model AC-CA), and a model that
permits the two break dates to shift both the level and the slope (Model CC). In
addition, Carrion-i-Silvestre, Sansó and Artís (2004) follow Lumsdaine and Papell
(1997) and dene a test statistic with two breaks for non-trending variables –that
we call Model AAn.
Alternative proposals, that we are also considering here, focus on the statistical
signicance of the dummy variables when estimating the date of the breaks. We
denote t¤®;jµj the ADF test where the break point is chosen so that it minimizes the
absolute value of the statistical signicance test for the level shift, i.e. T ¤b =
argmaxTb2(k+1;T )
¯¯
tµ^ (Tb; k)
¯¯
, being tµ^ the pseudo t-ratio for µ in ((5)). Note
that the maximization of the absolute value avoids imposing the sign of the break
effect. If the analyst is willing to assume some break effect’s direction, then the
break point can be estimated through either the minimization –if the break effect
7 Note that this test selects the break points that most favor the alternative hypothesis of sta-
tionarity, which implies that if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at T ¤b it would not be
rejected at whatever else date.
8 The three specications that dened are known as Models A, B and C, depending on if the
break affects the level, the slope or both, respectively.
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Table 2: Unit root tests with one level shift
t¤® T ¤b t
¤
®;jµj T
¤
b F
¤
®;µ T
¤
b
Czech Rep. -3.845 1997:02 -1.921 1992:04 17.343a 1992:04
Estonia -4.042 1998:10 -4.042 1998:10 8.198 1998:10
Hungary -4.466c 1999:08 -2.191 1992:11 10.765c 1992:11
Latvia -2.647 1995:08 -1.819 2002:07 3.830 2002:07
Lithuania -5.106b 1998:12 -5.106a 1998:12 13.105b 1998:12
Malta -2.916 2001:06 -2.916 2001:06 4.269 2001:06
Poland -3.823 1998:07 -3.823 1998:07 9.716c 1998:07
Slovakia -4.621b 1998:07 -4.621b 1998:07 10.731c 1998:07
Slovenia -5.746a 2000:02 -5.746a 2000:02 16.508a 2000:02
The critical values for the t¤® test for T = 100 are -5.33, -4.58 and -4.27 for the 1, 5 and 10% level of signicance,
respectively, and are obtained from Perron and Vogelsang (1992). The critical values for the t¤
®;jµj test are -4.92, -4.38
and -4.09, respectively, and are obtained by direct simulation. Finally, the ones for theF¤®;µ test are 9.47, 10.61 and 12.99
for the 10, 5 and 1% level of signicance, respectively, for a sample size T < 75, and 9.58, 10.84 and 13.48 respectively,
for a sample size of 75 < T < 125, and 9.72, 11.05 and 13.90, respectively, for T > 125.
is negative– or maximization –if it is positive– of the sequence of tµ^ tests. This
increases the power of the testing procedure, although it introduces a prior belief.
Finally, Montañés and Reyes (1997) propose using the information linked to the
statistical non-signicance of the deterministic terms under the null hypothesis
of unit root, as a mechanism to increase the power of the unit root testing.
Specically, it can be shown that the step dummy in ((5)) disappears under the
null hypothesis but it is statistically signicant under the alternative. Therefore, it
is possible to design a test statistic for the joint null hypothesis of ® = 1 and µ = 0
in ((5)). We denote this test as F ¤®;µ, where T
¤
b = argmaxTb2(k+1;T ) F®^;µ^ (Tb; k).
The results obtained from the application of the unit root tests allowing for one
level shift are presented in Table 2, where the order of the autoregressive correction
has been chosen with the t-sig criterion in Ng and Perron (1995) with kmax = 12.
It should be noted, rst, that all these tests provide consistent estimates of the
break dates. In addition, the unit root hypothesis is rejected for six out of the nine
countries that we have analyzed when we allow for one level shift.
The same qualitative conclusion is reached when two breaks are considered –
see Table 3. The unit root tests presented in Tables 1 and 2 have been specied
with a deterministic component given by a constant term, the most adequate model
according to the natural rate hypothesis. However, in practice, most time series
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Table 3: Unit root tests with two structural breaks
Model AAn Model AA
Test T ¤b;1 T ¤b;2 Test T ¤b;1 T ¤b;2
Czech Rep. -6.230b 1997:03 1998:05 -6.668b 1998:05 2001:08
Estonia -5.631b 1998:11 2001:07 -6.020c 1998:11 2001:07
Hungary -5.368c 1997:11 2000:05 -5.797 1992:08 2000:05
Latvia -4.562 1998:05 2002:07 -4.331 1996:01 1998:08
Lithuania -5.135 1999:01 2003:04 -6.042c 1998:01 2002:12
Malta -3.220 1999:05 2001:10 -7.269b 1999:12 2000:06
Poland -5.909b 1996:04 1998:08 -6.136c 1992:12 1996:04
Slovakia -6.226b 1992:12 1998:10 -5.822 1992:12 1998:10
Slovenia -6.283b 1993:03 2000:03 -6.311b 1993:03 2000:03
Model AC-CA Model CC
Test T ¤b;1 T ¤b;2 Test T ¤b;1 T ¤b;2
Czech Rep. -6.789b 1998:05 1994:09 -8.011b 1997:03 1999:02
Estonia -6.115 1998:11 2001:09 -6.131 1998:03 2000:09
Hungary -6.050 2000:09 1992:10 -6.277 1992:10 2000:10
Latvia -7.022b 1998:09 2002:10 -6.789c 1998:09 2002:08
Lithuania -7.391b 2002:02 1998:03 -7.450b 1998:01 2001:08
Malta -6.443c 2002:06 2000:08 -6.472 1999:12 2001:07
Poland -6.681b 1994:01 1996:06 -6.368 1994:02 1996:04
Slovakia -5.762 1992:12 1998:12 -4.980 1992:12 1998:10
Slovenia -6.394c 1993:03 2000:05 -6.175 1993:03 2000:03
The critical values for Model AAn are taken from Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2004), while for Models AA, AC-CA and
CC they have been obtained from Lumsdaine and Papell (1997). b, c, stand for rejection of the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity at 5 and 10% level of signicance, respectively.
exhibit a trending behavior. Although this contradicts the natural rate paradigm in
the limit, we should not discard the possibility of a time trend in the model for a
short period of time. This ts those cases of a slowly increasing natural rate –see
Papell et al. (2000).
Next we estimate the models allowing for a linear trend and more than one
break (model AA without a time trend in Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2004), that
we call model AAn, and models AA, AC and CC as in Lumsdaine and Papell
(1997)). Compared to the results in Table 2, we nd in this case stronger evidence
against the unit root hypothesis, since it is possible to reject the null hypothesis
of hysteresis for all the countries considered in, at least, one of the specications.
Therefore, we have found evidence of stationarity using test statistics that consider
the presence of structural breaks, a result that supports the shifting natural rate
hypothesis on the unemployment rate.
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3.2 Shifting NAIRU in the Accession countries. Political reforms and
structural breaks
In this section we give one step further and estimate the value of the NAIRU
using a univariate approach. This approach, in contrast to other alternatives, based
on the Phillips curve or on theories of the labor market, assumes that, over medium
to long horizons, the unemployment rate reverts to its natural rate. Thus, univariate
data on unemployment can be used to extract an estimate of the NAIRU as a local
mean of the series. We have chosen this option in order to avoid an additional
source of uncertainty related to the variety of feasible models explaining the
NAIRU and the fact that many of the explanatory variables involved in the NAIRU
calculations (such as ination expectations or the degree of excess demand) are
non-observable.
Here we follow the method in Staiger et al. (1997) who derive the NAIRU
estimates from the specication given by
Ut ¡ ¹Ut = ¯ (L)
¡
Ut¡1 ¡ ¹Ut¡1
¢
+ "t; (6)
where ¹Ut = ¹Ui for Tb;i¡1 < t · Tb;i, and ¯ (L) denotes the dynamics. This
approach assumes a shifting natural rate of unemployment, which means that,
in the long-run, the unemployment rate reverts to the path that describes the
breaking-mean model. Therefore, an estimate of the NAIRU can be obtained as a
local mean of the time series. Following the developments in Staiger et al. (1997),
((6)) can be expressed as
Ut = ¹+ µiDUi;t¡1 + ¯ (L)Ut¡1 + "t; (7)
which implies a NAIRU, i.e. local mean, of
¹Ui =
¹+ µi
1¡ ¯ (1)
for Tb;i¡1 · t < Tb;i, i = 1; : : : ; n. In the previous Section we have concluded
that the unemployment rates can be characterized as stationary processes once the
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analysis has accounted for up to two structural breaks. However, we are aware
of the limitations associated to the deterministic specications considered above.
First of all, the fact of just allowing for up to two structural breaks restricts the
kind of models to face. Second, some of the trending patterns that have been
highlighted above can be masking the presence of more than two structural breaks.
In order to overcome these drawbacks, we proceed to the estimation of both the
number of breaks and break dates as in Bai and Perron (1998), that is a suitable
method to detect discontinuities in stationary processes but that has proven to
provide consistent estimates of the break dates even for non-stationary variables.
3.2.1 Estimation of the number and position of the structural breaks
Briey speaking, Bai and Perron (1998) suggest applying the following
strategy. First, once a maximum number of breaks (nmax) has been dened,
we should obtain the global Sum of Squared Residuals (SSR) using a dynamic
optimization algorithm. As a result, we have nmax sets of time periods which are
taken as the estimates of the break dates. At this point, the goal is the estimation
of the number of breaks (n^). For this purpose, Bai and Perron (1998) design a
sequential testing procedure for non-trending variables that relies on testing for
the presence of structural breaks, rst, globally and, second, following a specic-
to-general principle. For the case of trending variables, they suggest using the
LWZ information criterion (Liu, Wu and Zidek (1997)).
This procedure allows not only to obtain an estimate of the number and position
of the structural breaks, but also to calculate condence intervals for the estimated
break dates. This is especially relevant in our particular application, as we are
interested in assessing the precision of the break point estimates due to the fact
that it might affect, in turn, the precision of the NAIRU estimates. Table 4 reports
the date and number of the estimated break points for the unemployment rates
when a maximum of nmax = 5 structural breaks have been allowed. The 90 and
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Table 4: Point and condence interval estimates for the date of the breaks
n^ CI T ¤b;1 T ¤b;2 T ¤b;3 T ¤b;4
Czech Rep. 5% 1996:07 1998:07
95% (95:10, 96:09) (98:1, 98:07)
90% (95:12 ,96:09) (98:2, 98:07)
Estonia 5% 1997:05 1999:03 2001:10
95% (97:03, 97:07) (99:01, 99:02) (01:08, 02:02)
90% (97:04, 97:07) (99:01, 99:02) (01:08, 02:01)
Hungary 5% 2000:3
95% (00:02, 00:04)
90% (00:02, 00:04)
Latvia 5% 1996:01 1998:9 2000:08 2002:06
95% (95:10, 96:02) (98:06, 98:09) (00:06, 01:01) (02:05, 02:06)
90% (95:10, 96:02) (98:06, 98:09) (00:06, 00:12) (02:05, 02:06)
Lithuania 5% 1995:05 1999:11 2002:01
95% (95:02, 95:06) (99:5, 99:10) (01:11, 02:09)
90% (95:03, 95:06) (99:5, 99:10) (01:11, 02:09)
Malta 5% 1998:02 1999:7 2001:11
95% (98:05, 98:09) (98:1, 99:8) (01:09, 02:05)
90% (98:06, 98:09) (98:5, 99:8) (01:09, 02:04)
Poland 5% 1992:11 1996:08 2000:01
95% (92:09, 93:08) (96:05, 96:11) (00:02, 00:07)
90% (92:09, 93:05) (96:05, 96:10) (00:03, 00:07)
Slovakia 5% 1998:12
95% (98:10, 00:06)
90% (98:10, 00:01)
10% 1993:01 1999:02
95% (92:10, 95:07) (98:08, 99:02)
90% (92:11, 94:10) (98:09, 99:01)
Slovenia 5% 1993:09 2000:4
95% (93:03, 93:12) (00:01, 00:08)
90% (93:04, 93:11) (00:02, 00:07)
The second column reports the signicance level that has been used for the sequential estimation of the break points. It refers to the 5% level of
signicance, but the same results are achieved when working at the 10% level (Slovakia being the only exception, as indicated in the table). The
third column offers the condence intervals at the 95% and 90% of probability. The maximum number of structural breaks is set to nmax = 5.
21
95% condence intervals for the break dates are also presented, and are computed
using a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust estimate of the variance of
the disturbance term. These results show that Hungary and Slovakia have suffered
one level shift, the Czech Republic and Slovenia two structural breaks, Estonia,
Lithuania, Malta and Poland three breaks and, nally, four structural breaks are
detected in the case of Latvia. Note that for Malta we have estimated three level
shifts, which can explain why we had to include a time trend in the specication
of the unit root hypothesis testing conducted in the previous Section. Looking at
the narrow condence intervals obtained, we can conclude that the break points
have been estimated quite precisely.
As the rest of the analysis is based on the structural changes estimated using
the Bai and Perron (1998) method, we present in Table 5 (columns 1 to 3) a
comparison of the estimated break dates obtained using the different unit root
tests9 in the previous section, with the breaks obtained with the Bai and Perron
(1998) procedure. The main conclusion that can be drawn from the table is that
they are broadly compatible. As Bai and Perron (1998) argue, their procedure
provides consistent estimates of the break-dates independently of the stationarity
nature of the variables. In the majority of the cases, when there are multiple
changes, the 1-break and 2-break tests are capturing part of them or, at least,
are detecting an instability period in the variable. This improvement in the
deterministic specication explains the higher power of these tests if compared
with those that do not account for instabilities, as they are able to reject the null of
non-stationarity (either with one or two breaks) for all the countries involved.
As an example of this compatibility, in the case of Slovenia the unit root tests
with one break estimate it in 2000:02. When we allow for two breaks, they appear
9 The rst column includes the resulting break-dates obtained using tests allowing for one
break. We present two dates when the tests gave different results. The second column cor-
responds to the test with two breaks in the levels in the models with non-trending regressors
(AAn) and with trending regressors (AA). The third column reports the results of the Bai and
Perron methodology to consistently estimate structural breaks.
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Table 5: Structural breaks. Comparison of the different methods
1 break tests 2 break tests n breaks León-Led/McAdam León-Led/McAdam
1 break (trend model) Markow Switching
Czech Rep. 1992:04 AAn: 1997:03 1996:07 1992:07 1997-98
1997:02 AAn: 1998:05 1998:07 1998:04
AA: 1998:05
AA: 2001:08
Estonia 1998:10 1998:11 1997:05 1998:10 Multiple changes
2001:07 1999:03 2000:05 (1995, 1996, 1999...)
2001:10
Hungary 1992:11 AAn: 1997:11 2000:03 1992:11 Multiple changes
1999:08 AAn: 2000:05
AA: 1992:08
AA:2000:05
Latvia 1995:08 AAn: 1998:05 1996:01 1998:04 1998
2002:07 AAn: 2002:07 1998:09 2000
AA: 1996:01 2000:08
AA: 1998:08 2002:06
Lithuania 1998:12 AAn: 1999:01 1995:05 1997:01 1998-1999
AAn: 2003:04 1999:11
AA: 1998:01 2002:01
AA: 2002:12
Malta 2001:06 AAn: 1999:05 1992:11
AAn: 2001:10 1999:07
AA: 1999:12 2001:11
AA: 2000:06
Poland 1998:07 AAn: 1996:04 1992:11 1996:03
AAn: 1998:08 1996:08
AA: 1992:12 2000:01
AA: 1996:04
Slovakia 1998:07 1992:12 n=1: 1998:12 1992:11 1998
1998:10 n=2: 1993:01
n=2: 1999:02
Slovenia 2000:02 1993:03 1993:09 1999:06 1994
2000:03 2000:04 1996
2000
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in 1993:03 and 2000:03. Finally, the Bai and Perron (1998) method places them
(also 2) in 1993:09 and 2000:04. If we allow for the 5% condence intervals
(already reported in table 4) all the results are highly in line.
The last two columns of table 5 are devoted to summarizing the main results
obtained by León-Ledesma and McAdam (2004) for a similar group of countries.
We should, however, emphasize that the results are not directly comparable.
The unit root test they have applied allows for a break in a model for trending
variables. In contrast, our one-break tests are applied to non-trended variables.
Despite this difference, the results are similar to ours in the 1-break tests for the
cases of the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary, and partially from our n-test
results for Latvia and Poland. Finally, in column 5 we present León-Ledesma and
McAdam (2004) dates of regime change that can be derived from their application
of the Markow-Switching methodology. Again, the changes in regime detected
are coincident with these we found in the cases of the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Signicant discrepancies are only found
in Hungary.
3.2.2 Explaining the breaks: the role of reforms in the transition economies
Before going any further in our estimation of the NAIRU, it is worth to shed
some light on the general or systemic characteristics of the transition process that
are on the ground of some of the breakpoints found in our analysis as well as
other specic shocks or circumstances that affected the different economies in a
heterogenous way. Eight of the new member states have a particularly interesting
economic background. In 1989 the transition from centrally planned to market
economies began embedding important common reforms: price liberalization
accompanied by more disciplined scal and monetary policies; privatization of
rms through different methods; a reform of the nancial sector and, nally, an
external sector reform (trade liberalization, currency convertibility and exchange
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rate regime choices). However, depending on the countries, the programs
differed on several respects: wage controls; privatization programs (spontaneous
privatization, using vouchers and restitutions or management-employment buy-
outs); the choice of exchange rate system (many countries pegged their exchange
rate, while others oated); nally, subsidies were removed at varying speeds.
Overall, during this transition period a big amount of measures have been
implement in all these countries but at a different pace in each of them. In fact,
a key debate among policy makers has been the choice between the gradualist
approach and a shock therapy (Roland (2000)). The argument for gradualism
is that it avoids the output and employment decline associated with a shock
therapy. In contrast, shock therapy involves a immediate economic adjustment
to the market economy. In a nutshell, labor reallocation was deemed to occur
mainly through unemployment, the single most important indicator of the speed
of transition trajectories (Boeri and Terrell (2002)).
The labor markets of the former centrally planned economies on the eve of
transition were characterized by full employment. This “full employment” was
achieved at the cost of low wages and a large amount of hidden unemployment
(e.g. about 30% according to some estimates). Employment was concentrated
in heavy industries and in the public sector, with private initiative only being
tolerated in the agricultural sector. Most Accession countries experienced
substantial falls in GDP and wages at the initial stage of transition. The exceptions
are the Czech Republic, that experienced a long period of low unemployment,
and Estonia, that achieved signicant labor reallocation from the beginning of the
transition process. The transition period has been characterized by job shedding
in the public sector, job creation in the private sector with an increased incidence
of temporary (frictional) unemployment and a signicant level of structural
unemployment. The temporary mismatch between labor demand and supply has
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been due to the length of time taken to develop new private enterprises and the
process of privatization.
Among the EU Accession countries, the three Baltic countries differ in
important ways from the remaining ve central European members of this group.
In addition, transition economies display an enormous diversity in terms of
physical and population size, level of development (as measured by GDP per
capita), natural resource endowment, and cultural and historical background,
greatly complicating intercountry comparison. Countries’ actual transition
experience has differed enormously, with respect to both policies implemented
and results achieved to date. The reason for the differences include the country’s
initial conditions, the external environment (notably external shocks), and the
specic policies pursued during the transition ( IMF (2001)).
From the point estimates of the breakpoints presented in Table 4, a rst broad
clustering of the countries in two groups can be made in terms of the number
of breaks. The rst one consists of the small countries (Baltic countries and
Malta) plus Poland, that display from 3 to 4 structural changes. The second
group includes medium-size economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia) that only experience one or two breaks. Thus, before proceeding to
estimate the short-term NAIRU, in the next subsection, we will also describe the
countries’ characteristics that may help to explain the timing of the breaks.
Firstly, the Baltic countries have had high growth but, at the same time,
relatively high unemployment. This can be partially explained by the fact that they
were all affected by the Russian economy crisis in 1998 (see Table 6). Estonia’s
economy is small, just 0.4% the size of France’s economy and 2.3% of France
population10. Because of the country’s small size and the open nature of its
economy, it is extremely vulnerable to external shocks. After its independence
10 The details about political events and the size and population of the transition countries has
been mainly obtained from Network (2003).
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in 1991 and an adjustment process, unemployment was decreasing (see the 1997
break). However, the Russian crisis pushed it upwards over 12% in 1999. This
economy can be characterized by its exibility, so that the recovery was rapid and
the new structural change in 2001 led the unemployment back to previous levels.
Latvia’s economy is tiny compared to most EU-15 and EUAccession countries.
Its GDP is just a 0.6% of France’s and 3.9% of its population. Latvia’s GDP
was the lowest of the 10 countries accepted for membership in 2004. As in the
previous case, its small size and openness leaves this economy at the mercy of
external shocks. In fact, Latvian economy was the most tightly linked to Russia,
because of the structure of Latvian exports. Of the four structural changes found
in the case of Latvia, the rst two are associated with increases in the short-term
NAIRU, whereas the two last show an improvement in the labor market. As in
Estonia, the 1998 structural break can be linked to the Russian crisis. In such an
open economy, persistent current account decits have been a bottleneck to Latvia
and have caused higher volatility in this country’s growth and employment rates.
Lithuania’s economy is the biggest among the Baltic states, but still is a small
open economy and shares with the others the same external constraint. After
experiencing one of the largest output declines of the former soviet republics
at the beginning of the nineties, the economy started growing in 1995, after the
currency’s peg to the dollar in 1994. However, in 1999-2000, Lithuania suffered
signicantly more than Estonia’s or Latvia’s in the aftermath of Russia’s nancial
crisis. The rapid unemployment increase is captured in the 1999:11 structural
break and, although the third break in 2002 is reecting a recent recovery, the
unemployment rate remains comparatively high. Lithuania has some structural
characteristics, such as a relatively high minimum wage and restrictions on hiring
part-time employees, which will continue to make unemployment rates difcult
to reduce. The above mentioned recovery in 2002 can be possibly due to the
measures undertaken in 2001 aiming at liberalizing the labor market as well as a
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faster privatization process and a sound scal discipline before the new peg to the
euro in February 2002.
The last small country, Malta, is 0.3% of France’s GDP and 0.7% of population.
However, on a per capita basis, Malta ranks among the richest new EU members.
Due to the country’s small size, its large dependence on tourism revenues and
the increasing open nature of its economy, makes it very susceptible to external
shocks. The three structural breaks found can be associated to global shocks, such
as the Russian and Latin American crises at the end of the nineties, but specially
the geopolitical tensions in the Middle-East and the downturn in world tourism
in the aftermath of September 11th. Therefore, Malta’s greatest risks lie in the
country’s overdependence on tourism revenues and the lack of diversity of its
manufacturing sector.
Finally, the case of Poland deserves special attention, as it is the only big
country that has experienced three structural changes, according to our results.
Although Poland is by far the largest of the EU accession countries (more than
three times the size of the Czech Republic, the second largest economy among
them) and, consequently, less exposed to external shocks that the small transition
countries, the strategy followed during the transition period explains a great deal
of its unemployment high levels and changes. Roughly, the size of the Polish
economy in terms of GDP is 14% that of France. However, in terms of GDP per
capita it ranks the sixth among the CEECs. Partially because of its size Poland
features the least open economy among the EU accession countries. During
most of the 1990s Poland was considered to be the undisputed leader among
the European transition economies implementing a radical “shock therapy” to
its economy in 1990. This early increase in unemployment is captured in the
rst structural change found in our analysis (1992:11) and it is also evident in
Figure 1. Therefore, Poland was the rst country in the region to come out of the
transition recession, reporting positive growth rates in GDP already in 1992. At
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the same time, it was the rst country to regain the pre-transition level of GDP in
1997. A second structural change is found in 1996:08, that can be associated to
the effects of the output growth in employment. However, this expansion in 1994-
97 led to substantial external imbalances and relatively high ination. Growth
in domestic demand was also supported by rather lax scal policy on the part of
the Social Democratic government. Consequently, the National Bank of Poland
tightened monetary conditions in an attempt to adjust the economy. Unfortunately
for Poland, this policy adjustment coincided with the Ruble crisis in Russia in
1998 and the slowdown in growth in Poland’s main export markets in the EU,
such as Germany. As a result of that, Poland’s economy growth also diminished
to 1.0-1.3% rates. The third structural change found in our analysis (2000:01) is
consistent with this recession.
While ination was clearly the weakest point in Poland’s economy in the early
stages of transition, unemployment is now, by far, the most important medium
term problem facing the Polish economy. Much more substantial changes to
the labor market structure and the employment taxation and regulations will be
necessary to reduce the unemployment problem more decisively11.
The second group of countries exhibiting one or two breaks are all of them
medium size economies.
First, Slovakia ranks fourth in terms of population and GDP among the 10
Accession countries, but behind the other Visegrad countries. Slovakia has the
same number of inhabitants than Denmark, but only about one eighth of its size in
terms of GDP. Compared with France, Slovakia has only 9% of its population and
2% of its GDP. Historically, Slovakia was much more rural than the neighboring
Czech Republic. Many of the rms built in Slovakia during the socialist period
were dedicated to the production of heavy industry and weapons to export to the
11 This point will be more extensively documented in section 3.3 where the persistence results
and the institutional discussion are presented.
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Soviet Union. Once trade with the USSR collapsed after 1989, Slovakia was in
a difcult position. Unemployment quickly surged, moreover, observers were
skeptical about the future of the Slovakian economy after their split from the
Czechs in 1993. Slovaks launched coupon privatization in the early nineties,
but the program stopped after the split, being replaced by the so-called “crony
capitalism”, where rms were sold to domestic allies of the ruling parties at rock-
bottom prices. That approach ended with 1998 Parliamentary elections, when a
pro-western government consisting of a broad range of parties took control of the
country, saving it from imminent collapse. The two structural changes detected
using Bai and Perron method are consistent with these facts: the rst one is found
in 1993:01, whereas the second appears at the end of 1998-beginning of 1999.
Second, Slovenia’s economy is 1.5% of the size of the France’s and its
population 3.3% of the number of French inhabitants. However, Slovenia’s
per capita GDP ranked as the highest among the EU accession countries: only
the Czech Republic and the Hungary’s GDP equal half of Slovenia’s level.
Slovenia’s small size and relative ethnic homogeneity have minimized political
problems, allowing the government to concentrate on supporting economic growth
and reform. Emerging from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, the country’s
ties to Western Europe (and specially Italy and Germany) laid the ground for
rapid economic development. Services, and more specically tourism, is a key
industry in the country. However, the largest single sector remains manufacturing.
Although it suffered from low productivity and relatively poor international
competitiveness, the government sponsored a wide program of employment
retraining and administrative limits on wages that boosted employment in the
late nineties. As evident from the corresponding graph in Figure 1, the two
structural breaks found in 1993:09 and 2000:04 are associated with reductions
in unemployment. In fact, the present rate is currently near its lowest historical
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level, around 6%, with most industrial restructuring nearly nished and production
projected to expand.
Third, the Czech Republic is among the largest and richest of the EU accession
countries. The country ranks second after Poland and closely followed by
Hungary. The Czech Republic comprises some of the historically wealthiest and
most industrialized territories in Europe. Although many local rms lost their
competitiveness during 40 years of communism, the country has retained certain
advantages in terms of brand-names and manufacturing tradition. The country
has been revitalized since 1989, attracting foreign tourists and investment. In the
early 1990s, the country was leader in economic reforms promoting liberalization.
Nonetheless, by 1996 many aws had been revealed, as the pace and the strategy
of the reform (coupon privatization and lack of regulation) were inadequate. This
lack of effective reforms kept unemployment unnaturally low. It was not until
former prime minister Vaclac Klaus and his allies lost power in late 1997 that
major restructuring took place. The two structural changes found in the empirical
analysis (1996:07 and 1998:07) show the rapid increase in unemployment in the
second half of the nineties.
Finally, Hungary’s GDP is about 4.5% of France’s and, in terms of population,
it is similar to the Czech Republic. This country started the transition process
in a strong position, as the communist government in the 1980s had already
installed some basic features of a market oriented economy, such as tax incentives
in special economic zones, that attracted highly qualied work force and a rapid
privatization process. After the 1995 stabilization plan, “Bokros program”, the
last years of the 1990s, under the coalition of Socialists and Free Democrats, have
achieved an improvement of the external position of the economy, accelerating
liberalization. The central bank, in cooperation with the government, employed a
crawling-peg exchange rate regime, that was abandoned in May 2001 in favor of
entering the ERM-2. The policy change and the advance of reforms is reected
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in a slow recovery of employment, as depicted in the corresponding graph and
captured in the structural change found in 2000:03.
3.2.3 OLS and Median Unbiased NAIRU estimates
Once the break-points have been detected, we can calculate the NAIRU both
for the point and condence interval estimates. The order of the autoregressive
model in ((7)) has been set using the LWZ information criterion allowing up to
kmax = 12 lags. In order to save space and to avoid repetitions, we report in
Table 7 the NAIRU values using the point estimates of the break points, along
with the estimations that are obtained using the lower and upper bound of the 95%
condence interval for the break dates –the results for the 90% condence interval
are also available upon request. This information provides us a rst insight on
how precisely the NAIRU is estimated, something that it has not been addressed
in previous empirical literature. Looking at these estimates we have to conclude
that, in general, the NAIRU is estimated with high precision given the small
discrepancies among the estimated NAIRUs. Less precise estimates are obtained
for Slovakia when only one level shift is allowed. However, the precision of the
NAIRU estimates for this country increases when two level shifts are included,
which means that the latter is the best specication for Slovakia. The NAIRU
estimates are depicted in Figure 1 and compared to the original variables.
Despite the good results in terms of precision of the NAIRU estimates discussed
above, these NAIRU univariate-based estimates are a biased approximation
due the procedure used in the computations12. In order to correct for this
distortion, Andrews (1993) suggests computing the exact median-unbiased (MU)
12 It is well known that the estimation of autoregressive specications like ((6)) or ((7)) by OLS
produces biased estimates of the parameters and, consequently, a biased estimated NAIRU. Fur-
thermore, the closest a stochastic process is to non-stationarity, the higher is the bias distortion.
In this case, the process is close to being non-stationary and, as the least squares estimator mini-
mizes the regression residual variance, it will tend to make the data-generating process appear to
be more stationary than it actually is by forcing the autoregressive parameter away from unity.
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Table 6: Dates of the breaks. Political and institutional events.
Breaks and main events
Countries 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Czech Rep. 1996:07 1998:07
Havel lost power
Post-transition recession
Restructuring
Estonia 1997:05 1999:03 2001:10
Russian crisis! Current account
decit
Hungary 2000:03
Early reform ERM-2
Stabilization Plan (1995) Employment recovery
Latvia 1996:01 1998:09 2000:08 2002:06
Tiny open economy
Exposed to external shocks Russian crisis!
Lithuania 1995:05 1999:11 2002:01
Exchange Russian crisis! New peg
rate peg Faster privatization
Fiscal discipline
Malta 1998:02 1999:07 2001:11
Tiny open economy September 11th
Exposed to external shocks Tourism
Poland 1992:11 1996:08 2000:01
Shock therapy for transition Monetary tightening Russian recession (#GDP)
Slovakia 1993:01 1999:02
Splits from 1998 elections
Czech Rep.
Slovenia 1993:09 2000:04
1991: splits from Yugoslavia
estimates for AR(1) processes. The goal is to substitute the OLS estimate for its
median unbiased counterpart, as the latter does not favor any particular outcome.
Thus, this bias correction delivers an impartiality property to the decision-
making process because there is an equal chance of under or overestimating
the autoregressive parameter. This issue is of special interest when measuring
persistence in time series, given that for positive AR(1) processes the estimate
of the autoregressive parameter is downward biased. Moreover, an unbiased
estimate of the autoregressive parameter will allow us to calculate an unbiased
scalar estimate of persistence in the next sub-section.
The direction of the bias is not clearly dened for models of higher order than
AR(1), although the estimate of the sum of the autoregressive coefcients tends
to exhibit a downward and large bias –see Andrews and Chen (1994). Once
again, this is extremely important for our purpose since the sum of these AR
coefcients is involved in the computation of the NAIRU. Thus, if precise NAIRU
estimates have to be obtained, the estimation bias should be accounted for. For this
purpose, we can apply the procedure proposed by Andrews and Chen (1994), who
extend the approach in Andrews (1993) to AR(p) processes, and design an iterative
process to approximate median-unbiased estimators for models such as the ones
in ((6)) or ((7)). Their procedure only provides approximate MU estimates due to
the use of estimators rather than true parameters in one stage, and due to the use
of pseudorandom numbers –see Andrews and Chen (1994) for further details13.
In addition and more importantly, the application of these techniques produces
condence intervals for the parameters of interest, i.e. the sum of the AR
coefcients, which provides further information to the analyst on the accuracy
of the estimates. Thus, interval estimation addresses the low-power problem
associated with unit roots, by informing us of whether we are failing to reject
13 In brief, the iterative procedure starts with the OLS estimation of
ut = ¹+ µiDUi;t¡1 + ®ut¡1 + ° (L)¢ut¡1 + "t;
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Table 7: NAIRU. Point and 95% condence interval estimates
NAIRU. Point estimates for T ¤b;i
Regime
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Czech Rep. 3.25 5.61 8.08
Estonia 9.96 9.03 12.13 9.75
Hungary 7.63 5.63
Latvia 10.07 11.50 14.02 12.90 10.91
Lithuania 6.72 10.23 15.56 13.14
Malta 5.87 6.41 6.82 7.70
Poland 12.14 15.42 13.58 18.50
Slovakia 12.50 18.35
11.05 12.65 18.40
Slovenia 7.57 7.13 6.12
NAIRU. Lower bound for the 95% CI of T ¤b;i
Regime
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Czech Rep. 3.21 4.55 8.03
Estonia 9.97 8.96 12.15 9.77
Hungary 7.63 5.63
Latvia 10.07 11.39 14.02 12.87 10.76
Lithuania 7.11 9.92 15.27 13.07
Malta 5.99 6.72 6.71 7.74
Poland 12.03 15.75 13.35 18.59
Slovakia 12.30 18.41
10.80 12.44 18.26
Slovenia 7.17 7.21 6.15
NAIRU. Upper bound for the 95% CI of T ¤b;i
Regime
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Czech Rep. 3.18 5.71 8.08
Estonia 9.83 9.40 11.57 9.96
Hungary 7.60 5.60
Latvia 10.26 11.73 13.65 12.85 10.64
Lithuania 7.11 10.30 15.06 12.74
Malta 6.15 6.68 7.02 7.79
Poland 13.59 15.05 14.02 18.88
Slovakia 16.01 16.50
12.42 12.93 18.39
Slovenia 7.77 6.97 6.21
For Slovakia we present the NAIRU that is obtained with one and two level shifts in the rst and second entry for this
country, respectively.
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the null because it is true or because there is too much uncertainty about the true
value of the autoregressive parameter. All these elements allow us to assess the
precision with which the NAIRU values have been approximated. Table 8 presents
these OLS and MU estimates of ®. Note that the ®^MU estimates are always larger
than the ®^OLS ones, which reects the downward bias associated to the OLS
estimation method. The consequence of working with a higher ® is the increase
in the NAIRU estimates –this becomes evident from the comparison of Tables 7
and 8. Moreover, notice that the condence intervals that have been computed for
the ®^MU reveal that, in general, non-stationarity is found at the upper bound. The
case of Slovakia is remarkable, since we have obtained that ®^MU = 1 when we
only allow for one structural break. However, when taking into account two level
shifts the ®^MU drops below one. This suggests that it is better to consider two
level shifts for this country, as commented above.
3.2.4 Modied Phillips Curves
According to Richardson et al. (2000) the short-run NAIRU indicator
is probably of the greatest relevance to the operation of monetary policy.
By construction the short-run NAIRU gap will be closely correlated with
contemporaneous or predicted changes in ination. The short-run NAIRU can be
seen as a useful synthesis of information concerning current inationary pressures.
However, the usefulness as a forecast for future ination is limited for several
reasons. First, differences between NAIRU and short-run NAIRU are likely to
which is a reparametrization of ((7)) with ® = ¯ (1). Treating °^1 (L) as if they were the true
values of ° (L), the procedure computes the bias-corrected estimator of ®, denoted as ®^1MU ,
as the value that has as a median ®^1OLS . Then, conditional on ®^
1
MU we obtain the estimates of
°^2 (L). After that we conduct another iteration, assuming that °^2 (L) are the true values of ° (L)
and computing a second bias-corrected estimator of ®, ®^2MU , as the value that has as a median
®^2OLS . The iterations for j = 1; 2; : : : continue after some convergence criterion is achieved–
due to the computational cost we have specied as the convergence criterion that the difference
between two consecutive iterations should be
¯¯
®^j+1MU ¡ ®^jMU
¯¯
< 0:01. Andrews and Chen (1994)
report simulation results concluding that this approximation provides accurate median-unbiased
estimates.
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Table 8: MU-based NAIRU estimates
NAIRU. Point estimates for T ¤b;i
95% CI for ®^MU NAIRU estimates using ®^MU . Regimes
®^OLS ®^MU Lower Upper 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Czech Rep. 0.950 0.976 0.932 1 3.42 7.21 8.33
Estonia 0.797 0.836 0.748 0.934 9.91 9.28 12.04 9.71
Hungary 0.920 0.945 0.887 1 7.65 5.56
Latvia 0.810 0.846 0.768 0.931 10.19 11.68 13.87 12.92 10.77
Lithuania 0.904 0.926 0.880 0.974 7.28 10.38 15.53 13.20
Malta 0.841 0.967 0.807 1 9.94 7.39 7.24 8.64
Poland 0.971 0.988 0.960 1 10.58 13.50 15.50 17.75
Slovakia 0.939 0.961 0.911 1 12.79 18.28
0.923 0.944 0.898 1 11.59 12.96 18.46
Slovenia 0.934 0.970 0.907 1 9.17 6.77 6.03
NAIRU. Lower bound for the 95% CI of T ¤b;i
95% CI for ®^MU NAIRU estimates using ®^MU . Regimes
®^OLS ®^MU Lower Upper 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Czech Rep. 0.964 0.998 0.949 1 6.00 23.50 13.00
Estonia 0.808 0.845 0.756 0.985 9.96 8.99 12.18 9.70
Hungary 0.921 0.944 0.884 1 7.75 5.59
Latvia 0.872 0.925 0.846 1 10.07 11.51 14.28 12.75 10.36
Lithuania 0.927 0.954 0.904 1 7.85 10.04 15.59 13.00
Malta 0.873 0.977 0.833 1 13.30 15.30 7.35 9.65
Poland 0.964 0.983 0.949 1 11.53 15.35 14.24 18.71
Slovakia 0.927 0.946 0.897 1 12.43 18.41
0.925 0.956 0.896 1 11.75 12.61 18.43
Slovenia 0.905 0.934 0.873 1 7.36 7.20 6.12
NAIRU. Upper bound for the 95% CI of T ¤b;i
95% CI for ®^MU NAIRU estimates using ®^MU . Regimes
®^OLS ®^MU Lower Upper 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Czech Rep. 0.944 0.966 0.925 1 3.26 6.62 8.09
Estonia 0.875 0.917 0.838 1 9.77 9.41 11.48 9.93
Hungary 0.922 0.950 0.888 1 7.76 5.56
Latvia 0.835 0.876 0.798 0.957 10.22 11.68 13.60 12.80 10.63
Lithuania 0.926 0.947 0.906 0.996 7.49 10.55 15.21 12.72
Malta 0.870 0.989 0.841 1 14.91 10.18 8.73 10.73
Poland 0.974 0.994 0.963 1 15.17 11.33 18.00 19.17
Slovakia 0.983 1 0.973 1 1 1
0.938 0.969 0.917 1 13.23 13.58 18.52
Slovenia 0.950 0.987 0.934 1 11.23 6.23 6.31
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be most marked for those economies characterized by strong persistence effects
(such as some transition economies). Secondly, the short-run NAIRU gaps have
restrictions to be used to forecast future ination because they are based on
the current short-term NAIRU estimated, observed unemployment rates and the
unrealistic assumption that there are no future supply shocks and that medium
term NAIRU remains constant.
Bearing the above mentioned limitations in mind, we have used the short-run
NAIRU values resulting from the MU estimates obtained in the previous sections
to draw a modied Phillips curve as in Hahn (1996). In Figure 2 we present, for
all the countries considered in the analysis, these modied Phillips curves with
the percentage gap in unemployment rates (the difference between the actual and
the NAIRU rate of unemployment) in the horizontal axis and consumer prices
ination in the vertical axis –the data is drawn from the International Financial
Statistics CD-ROM of the IMF. According to the theory, we expect a negative
relationship between the two variables provided that the expectations correspond
to a short-run Phillips curve. Changes in the stance of monetary policy and,
therefore, in the agents’ expectations, may shift the curve upwards or downwards.
Along a short-run Phillips curve, high (low) ination rates are associated with
current unemployment below (above) the short-term NAIRU.
This is the picture that results from the majority of the accession countries
in Figure 2: the relation between the ination rate and the unemployment gap
is clearly negative. Moreover, with the exception of Malta, where the ination
rate is very low for the whole period and the sample shorter than in the other
cases, the short-run Phillips curves have been moving downwards, as the monetary
authorities gradually were able to reduce the high ination rates experienced at the
beginning of the transition period.
Although the process is more acute in the Baltic countries, all the countries
analyzed exhibit the same pattern: they depart in the early 1990s from high levels
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of ination that are progressively reduced. Their relation with the unemployment
gap describes a zigzag behavior. However, once low levels of ination are
achieved, the unemployment rate gap does not seem to affect so strongly the
ination rates.
From the picture, the short-run Phillips curves cross several times, in all the
countries in the sample, the vertical line drawn at zero. Along this line the
current rate equals the short-run NAIRU, so that this means that this works as
an attractor or equilibrium value. This would validate the natural rate hypothesis
and, indirectly, the adequacy of the techniques we have applied to compute the
short-term NAIRU.
3.3 Measuring persistence
Shocks persistence has been extensively analyzed in the macroeconomic
literature primarily related to output, the labor market –unemployment rates–
and prices –deviations from the purchasing power parity (PPP). There are several
concepts of persistence associated with the use of different techniques applied
to its measure, although the common practice consists of summarizing the
persistence in a scalar –see Cochrane (1988), Andrews and Chen (1994) and
Murray and Papell (2002).
The most extended approach is the one that relies on the computation of the
half-life of a shock. This denition measures persistence as the number of time
periods required for a unit impulse to dissipate by one half, i.e. denotes the median
lag. The popularity of this approach is mainly due to the ease of computation.
Thus, when the process is an AR(1) the half-life (HL) can be easily obtained as
HL = ln (0:5) = ln (®), where ® denotes the autoregressive parameter. However,
this approximation to theHL does not work for AR processes of order higher than
one, as it does not account for the dynamics of the stochastic process. Instead, the
HL should be computed by the impulse response function (IRF).
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In our case, we will concentrate on the computation of the half-life of a shock
affecting unemployment based on the MU estimates. As Cashin, McDermott
and Pattillo (2004) point out, the MU point and interval estimates of the HL
can be interpreted as follows: rst, when determining whether the variable
suffers transitory (nitely persistent) or permanent (innitely persistent) shocks,
the selection rule chooses transitory if the bias-corrected half-life is nite and
chooses permanent if the bias-corrected half-life is innite; second, the width of
the condence interval allows assessing the level of uncertainty about the true
persistence of the shocks.
In Table 9 we present the results of the computation of the measure of
persistence based on the MU estimates obtained in the previous Section. In this
case, instead of using the alphabetical order, as in previous tables, we have ordered
the countries from those that exhibit more rapid adjustment, at the top, to these
for which adjustment is sluggish. This ordering will later ease the interpretation
of the results. As before, we have also focused on its sensitivity to the break
points estimates. Thus, the rst column of Table 9 reports the results obtained
using the point estimates of T ¤b;i, while the second and third columns correspond
to the lower and upper bounds that dene the 95% condence interval for T ¤b;i.
The computations are also carried out using the lower and upper bounds of the
95% condence interval for the ® parameter, which in turn provide a condence
interval for these measures of persistence. The half-lives are, with the exception
of Slovakia with one level shift, nite. According to the selection rule explained
above, the unemployment rate would suffer just transitory shocks. In addition,
when looking at the half-lives for the point estimates of T ¤b;i we conclude that
they are below two years. With the exceptions of the Czech Republic, Malta,
Poland and Slovenia, this result is robust when we compute the half-life using
the lower and upper bounds of the break point estimates. The medians of HL
are 7.86, 7.54 and 9.06 for the point, lower and upper bounds of T ¤b;i estimates,
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Table 9: Half-life using MU estimates
Point estimates for T ¤b;i 95% Condence interval for T ¤b;i
Lower bound Upper bound
Latvia 2.52 4.69 2.92
(1.85, 4.76) (2.61,1) (2.03, 7.22)
Estonia 2.88 3.19 5.53
(1.92,7.31) (2.04, 34.86) (2.82,1)
Lithuania 3.84 5.56 4.80
(2.79, 8.23) (3.35,1) (3.26, 47.34)
Hungary 7.86 7.77 8.59
(4.10,1) (4.00,1) (4.12,1)
Slovakia 8.37 6.47 1
(3.99,1) (3.74,1) (11.45,1)
5.76 7.54 10.05
(3.43,1) (3.59,1) (4.17,1)
Czech Rep. 12.72 72.30 9.06
(4.83,1) (6.01,1) (4.47,1)
Slovenia 14.43 6.10 32.29
(4.68,1) (3.43,1) (6.19,1)
Poland 17.85 14.22 31.41
(8.04,1) (6.99,1) (8.39,1)
Malta 17.88 27.49 52.87
(2.50,1) (2.93,1) (3.01,1)
MEDIAN 7.86 7.54 9.06
(3.43,1) (3.43,1) (4.12,1)
The second column provide the HL estimates using the break points estimates, while the third and fourth columns
correspond to the HL estimates using the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the 95% condence interval for the
break points estimates. The condence interval for theHL appears between parentheses.
respectively, which indicate that deviations from the NAIRU correct quite rapidly.
These results crucially depend on the differences in the labor market institutions
that have been set up during the transition period.
Labor reallocation is a critical aspect of the transition process and because
there is a signicant variation in the timing of reforms across transition countries
we nd important asymmetries in the trajectories these countries have followed.
Apart from this reason, there is a large body of theory mainly developed within
the OECD framework that suggests that different types of social policy and labor
market institutions inuence greatly the distinct trajectories of adjustment in the
new EU countries.
The role of institutional labor market rigidities is a matter of increasing concern.
From the seminal papers by Layard and Jackman (1991) and Scarpetta (1996)
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Table 10: Main characteristics of the unemployment benet system
Employment Waiting Payment rate % Duration
conditions period (months)
Czech 12 months in 3 7 days 50% 6
Republic years 40% after 3 months
Estonia 12 in 24 7 days 50% for rst 100 days 180 days, longer in
months 40% thereafter case of long
insurance
Hungary 12 months in 4 — 65% 12
years
Latvia 9 months in 12 ? 50% for 6 months, then 9 months
months depending on employ-
ment and duration
Lithuania 24 months in 3 7 days 19-34% 6 months in 12
years months
Malta ? ? Flat rate 150 days
Poland 365 days in 18 1 day Flat rate 18 max (lower in
months areas with low
unemployment)
Slovenia 12 in last 18 ? 70% of average wage 3-24 months depen-
months in last 12 months for 3 ding on length of
months, 60% afterwards employment history
Slovakia 24 months in 3 — 50% 6 or 9 months de-
years 45% after 3 months pending on length of
employment history
Extracted from Burger (2003).
Table 11: Minimum wages
Minimum wage as Year Monthly minimum
% of average wage wage, January 2003
in in PPP
Czech Rep. 34.0% 2001 199 389
Estonia 28.2% 1999 138 264
Hungary 40.0% 2001 212 384
Latvia 40.0% 2000 116 239
Lithuania 40.0% 2001 125 252
Malta 74.0%¤ 2001 535 752
Poland 38.0% 2000 201 351
Slovakia 38.5% 2000 118 265
Slovenia 58% target value 451 668
EU-15 45.0%-50% Min: 416 Min: 543
Extracted from (Burger, 2003). * in percentage of average net rates.
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there is an increasing empirical literature about the role that institutional factors
play in determining the persistence of unemployment making clear their crucial
importance not only for the determination of the structural unemployment rate but
also for the speed of labor market adjustments14. Apart from shocks (variations
in productivity, labor demand, real import price or real interest rates) and
macropolicies, the longer-term patterns of unemployment tend to be dominated
by shifts in the equilibrium rate. The speed of adjustment to that equilibrium will
be affected by any variable which inuences the ease with which unemployment
individuals can be matched, and secondly, by any variable which tends to raise
wages (despite excess supply in the labor market). Most of these variables
reect market institutions such as unemployment benets or unions. There are
four aspects of the unemployment benet system that may inuence the speed
adjustment to the equilibrium: the level of benets, the duration of entitlement,
the coverage of the system and the strictness with which the system is operated.
Of these, only the rst two are available as time series for the CEEC countries that
belong to the OECD.
According to Boeri et al. (1998) the transition process involves new job matches
using workers with different skills that should generate an explosion of earning
differentials at all levels, between the public and private sectors, between and
within rms as well as across regions. However, these inequalities may be
mitigated by institutions imposing wage oors (e. g. unions, tax income
policies, minimum wages and employment protection). These institutions are
constraints to the adjustment process, generating more unemployment. However,
the scarce empirical evidence existing up to date tends to signal a modest
inuence of the variables on the labor market in most transition economies.
This effect was due to the lack of credibility of the old unions which had
14 See Elmeskov and Scarpetta (1998), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nickell and Quintini
(2002).
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supported the communist regime, the intermittent use of the tax income policies
(by 1995 many of the CEECs had abandoned these policies) and a lax use of
the minimum wages (by 1996 minimum wages had fallen to about 30% of the
average wage in all CEECs). Minimum wages were not binding in Hungary.
However, minimum wages played some role indirectly as they served in all
transition countries as a basis for calculating most social benets (e. g. welfare,
unemployment, and health benets). Finally, the role played by employment
protection regulation (severance pay and notice periods) seems to have been
rather limited, especially compared to active policies (wage subsidies, direct job
creation and schemes for school leavers) that have been pretty successful in some
countries like the Czech Republic. The best studied item for the case of the
transition countries has been the impact of unemployment programs (both active
and passive) on the duration of unemployment and the probability of nding a job.
Unemployment benets were initially set at relatively high levels and provided in
some cases for unlimited duration. However, as the number of beneciaries was
increasing rapidly, the conditions became more strict. The maximum duration
was halved in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary and reduced to one year in Poland.
The unemployment benets (welfare assistance, disability benets and sickness
benets) have played a non-standard function of relatively high importance in the
transition countries as they have put “de facto” a oor to wage setting.
Going back to Table 9, we can see that there is a link between the
speed of adjustment from a short-term NAIRU to the next one and the labor
market institutions. In table 10 we summarize the main characteristics of the
unemployment benet systems of the accession countries, whereas in table 11
we present the minimum wages. From the comparison of the three tables it
becomes evident that those countries that enjoy more social benets and higher
minimum wages are those which exhibit the largest half-lives. Examples of this
behavior are Poland, Malta, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Take, for example,
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the unemployment and social assistance paid when unemployment insurance is
exhausted, that just amounts to 15% of the average wage in the Baltic countries,
over 20% in Hungary, and about 33% in the Czech and Slovak republic. This
matches exactly the ordering found when computing the half-lives in Table 9, up
to the particular case of Poland (which is at the bottom of the table), that has the
most generous benet scheme no matter the indicator used.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we address two questions related to the behavior of the
unemployment rate in the EU Acceding countries. First, we test for hysteresis
versus natural rate hypothesis; second, once we assume that the time series
properties of the variables are compatible with a changing natural rate, we use
a univariate approach to measure the NAIRU as the local mean of unemployment
in-between structural changes. In addition to these two policy-oriented goals, we
devote some space to the discussion of the sources of uncertainty that produce
imprecision in the estimates of the NAIRU. This is a key issue that should put
a word of caution before the NAIRU estimates are used in policy-making. A
conclusion of the analysis, also found in previous very comprehensive studies,
such as Staiger et al. (1997), is the risk of obtaining imprecise estimates of the
NAIRU, even when the analyst applies the state of the art statistical techniques.
Concerning the rst of the questions, the application of the standard GLS-class
of unit root tests leads to conclude in favor of hysteresis in the unemployment
rates. However, when allowing for the presence of up to two structural breaks in
unit root testing the conclusions reverse: the null hypothesis of hysteresis can be
rejected for all the countries analyzed. Thus, the empirical evidence points to the
fullment of the shifting natural rate paradigm. This is in accordance with the
experience of these countries in the past decade, since their economies suffered
the transition process from communism to the capitalist system.
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In a second stage, our analysis has allowed to approximate a measure of the
NAIRU that characterizes these economies. The applied statistical techniques pay
special attention to two of the sources of uncertainty mentioned in the literature.
First, the uncertainty arising from not knowing the parameters of the model, that
we address by computing condence intervals that provide reliable and accurate
measures of this imprecision. Second, the uncertainty related to the stochastic
nature of the NAIRU, that we treat by allowing for breaks that occur at unknown
dates and that we consistently estimate. In addition, we calculate the NAIRU not
only for the point estimates derived from the models, but also for the condence
intervals. We also report the results using two alternative estimation methods, the
downward-biased OLS estimator and the median-unbiased estimator. Correcting
for the OLS bias produces larger autoregressive parameters and affects the NAIRU
estimates. However, independently of the estimation method, the main conclusion
is that these NAIRU univariate-based estimates are measured quite precisely.
The empirical difculties and inaccuracies related to NAIRU measurement are
well documented in the literature. Although this limits its usefulness as a policy
tool in terms of macroeconomic policy-making, it provides relevant information
that can still be used jointly with a range of other indicators. Additionally,
measuring the NAIRU can be potentially relevant for the microeconomic analysis
of the labor markets. Thus, NAIRU estimates for the Accession countries can be
used as a measure of cross-country differences in the functioning of labor markets.
From the estimation of the structural breaks and the sum of the autoregressive
coefcients, we can draw several features describing unemployment dynamics in
transition countries.
First, from the point estimates of the breakpoints, a rst broad clustering of
the countries in two groups can be made in terms of the number of breaks.
The rst one consists of the small countries (Baltic countries and Malta) plus
Poland, that display from 3 to 4 structural changes. The second group includes
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medium-size economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) that
only experience one or two breaks. The reason behind these differences may be
closely related to the degree of openness, larger in the case of the tiny economies
and, then, more exposed to external shocks. In the case of Poland, the higher
number of breaks is due to the special transition strategy followed from the very
beginning of the nineties. A second feature derived from the analysis is that the
estimated breaks are associated with political or institutional events of relevance
in the transition process. Some of these events are common to all the countries
(such as the Russian crisis), whereas other are idiosyncratic.
Third, and related to the persistence measures, the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania) have low autoregressive coefcients and, thus, lower persistence
and shorter half-lives, whereas a second group of countries, less homogeneous,
consisting of the Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, show
higher persistence. The differences found across countries may be explained, in
this case, by the institutional framework in the labor market. Those countries that
enjoy more social benets and higher minimum wages are those which exhibit the
largest half-lives. Also related to this last feature, although the Baltic countries
turn out to have a relatively high NAIRU estimate, it has been decreasing in the
last regimes, maybe due to the ease of adjustment after a shock. Finally, some
of the previous conclusions are reinforced when analyzing the evolution of the
modied Phillips curves, that have shifted downwards in all the countries, with
special intensity in the Baltic countries.
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Figure 1. Unemployment rates and NAIRU OLS-based estimates of the CEECs
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Figure 2. Unemployment rate gap and ination
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